



Do New England’s Public $chools
Need Finance Reform? Part 1
By Daniel G. Swaine
R esiding in the "land ofoppommity," we Ameri-
cans generally believe in an equal chance for
all individuals to succeed, rich or poor. Consequendy, we
created and have long supported a system of universal public
education, which is widely seen as an equalizer. However, we
also have another tradition that extends back to colonial times
-- resistance to centralized authority. Because of this second
tradition, the United States has a federalist system of govern-
ment that spreads authority across three levels: federal, state,
and local. Public education developed state by state, and state
governments typically delegate control over public educa-
tion to local districts, with the result that schools have been
financed through the local property tax. Since property wealth
is unequally distributed across districts, educational spend-
ing exhibits wide disparities.
How do we provide equal educational opportunities
while maintaining local control over schools? This question
has proved to be one of the most controversial policy issues
of the last quarter-century. Frustrated by the slow pace of
legislative efforts to equalize school spending, advocates of
greater equality have challenged existing systems of school
finance in state courts across the nation. In New England,
four court challenges have been successful: Connecticut in
1977, Massachusetts in 1993, and Vermont and New Hamp-
shire in 1997. A fifth challenge in Rhode Island went as far
as the Superior Court before it languished on appeal. A sixth
challenge, filed in Connecticut in early 1998, is still pend-
ing. The decisions rendered in these cases have forced school
finance reform to the top of the legislative agenda in nearly
all New England states.
In a three-part series, Fiscal Facts examines the issues posed
by educational finance reform:
¯ In this issue, we present a summary of the legal strat-
egies used to challenge school finances in state courts and
discuss how these strategies have been employed in New En-
gland. In addition, we discuss the three main fiscal equaliza-
tion strategies used to narrow spending disparities and the
fiscal remedies that have been enacted by the New England
states to address court-ordered reforms.
¯ In our next issue, we will evaluate the extent to which
the enacted fiscal remedies have achieved their intended goals
in Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Vermont.
¯ Many critics of school finance reform argue that indi-
viduals acquire a poor education because schools are ineffi-
cient, not because they lack sufficient funds. These critics
note that while per-pupil spending has increased in infla-
tion-adjusted terms over the last quarter-century, student
performance as measured by standardized achievement tests
has remained constant at best. Although many factors come
into play, this result implies that finance reforms may equal-
ize resources, but fail to equalize educational outcomes. Since
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education, some critics argue that states should impose performance requirements contempora-
neously with all increases in fiscal aid. We will conclude the series by discussing educational perfor-
mance reform in the context of school finance reform.
The School Finance Problem: Unequal Access
During the public school movement of the mid-nineteenth century, states added clauses to
their constitutions providing for the education of their residents. These constitutional provisions
stipulate education as a state responsibility. However, state legislatures interpreted this mandate in a
manner consistent with the tradition of decentralization -- most enacted subsequent legislation
delegating this responsibility to local school districts, with each having the authority to form a
school system and to raise revenues to fund operations. Local property taxes, the primary source of
revenues for municipal governments, became the main revenue source used to finance schools.
But property wealth is distributed unequally across communities, and, as a result, students from
different communities will
likely have unequal access to
educational resources.
If all districts levied iden-
tical tax rates, then property-
rich districts would raise
greater property tax revenues
(per pupil) than property-
poor districts. Since property
tax revenues provide most of
the funding for school expen-
ditures, rich districts would be
able to spend more for educa-
tion than poor districts.
Viewed another way; if all dis-
tricts were to spend the same
amount on a per-pupil basis,
property-poor districts would
have to levy much higher tax
rates than property-rich dis-
tricts.
Variations in Property Wealth Can Cause
Sizable Inequities in Educational Funding
Data fi’om Texas Illustrate Inequities
Thousands of 1997 Dollars Percent
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Property tax rate that would have to be
levied in order for all districts to raise statewide
per-pupil average revenues (right scale)
Per-pupil revenues that would
be raised at average tax rate
for state (left scale)
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Per-Pupil Property Value (Thousands of 1997 Dollars)
Note: Property values are plotted as deciles, with the first decile
broken into two parts. Data are for academic year 1986 - 87
Source: Allan Odden and Lawrence Piccus. School Finance:
A Policy Perspective (1992), chapter 1.
Chart 1 illustrates this problem using data on per-pupil property wealth of Texas school districts
for the academic year 1986-87.’ The light green line represents per-pupil revenues that could be
raised from property tax assessments, assuming an equal tax rate (at the state average) across districts.
As a district’s per-pupil property wealth increases, its tax revenue (per-pupil) rises proportionately.
The dark green line shows the property tax rate that would need to be charged by each locality to
spend at the statewide per-pupil average.
Legal Strategies
Because pervasive and persistent wealth disparities imply that students will have unequal access
to educational resources, advocates of the "equal opportunity" tradition have challenged existing
systems of school finance in state courts.
The problem of unequal access suggests a legal strategy based on the equal protection clause of
t Texas is used as an example because these data were readily available.the U.S. Constitution or similar clauses in state constitu-
tions.2 However, many state laws do treat individuals un-
equally. Laws that establish certification requirements to
operate a motor vehicle or to practice certain professions are
examples of laws that discriminate among individuals. The
rationale for treating individuals unequally in these circum-
stances is to protect the public from harm. Therefore, as long
as the state has a logical basis for legislating differential treat-
ment, the courts generally uphold the constitutionality of
unequal treatment. In school finance cases, the state’s ratio-
nale for creating unequal access to educational resources is its
right to delegate responsibility to local governments. How-
ever, if a statute violates a "fundamental right," or creates a
discriminatory grouping that has no logical basis, then the
courts generally hold that unequal treatment is unconstitu-
tional.
Thus, in school finance cases, the burden of proof rests
with the plaintiffs to argue that unequal access to educational
resources violates a "fundamental right." If the plaintiffs are
successful, then the burden of proof shifts to the state. Accord-
ing to the courts, the state must argue (1) that there is "a com-
pelling state interest" for unequal access, and (2) that there is
"no less discriminatory" policy the state could use to satisfy the
compelling interest. Therefore, in court challenges to school
finances that are based on equal protection, plaintiffs must
make two argtunents: (1) that education is defined as a "fun-
damental right," and (2) that there is an alternative financing
scheme based on the principle of flscal neutraliw.3
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in 1973 (RodHguezv. San
Antonio School D#tH~ that education is not a fundamental
right guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution, effectively ending
all challenges to school finances in the federal courts.4 But
education is specifically mentioned as a state responsibility in
every state constitution, so basing challenges on state equal
protection clauses has proved to be a more viable legal strateg~
The existence of an education clause in every state con-
stitution has also led to the development of a second legal
strategy. In mandating education as a state responsibility,
education clauses use such phrases as "a basic education," "a
thorough education," or "an adequate education." Legal chal-
lenges based on these clauses have interpreted the particular
phrases in a meaningful way, arguing (1) that these phrases
mandate more than a minimal education for all residents,
and (2) that property wealth disparities interfere with the
fulfillment of this mandate.
An early successful challenge to school finances that em-
ployed both legal strategies (Robinson v. Cahila 1973) oc-
curred in New Jersey, with the result that the second argument
won the case. Since the Robinson decision, most subsequent
legal challenges have employed this dual strategy- thirty-
four states have faced school finance litigation, with slightly
more than half of these challenges being successful.
New Englan~ Court Challenges
Four successful challenges to school finances have oc-
curred in New England: Horton v. Meskillin Connecticut in
1977; McDuf~ v. Secretaty of Education in Massachusetts in
1993; Claremont v. Governor et al. in New Hampshire in
1997; Brighamv. VermontinVermont in 1997. Two of these
cases are textbook exan~ples of the legal strategy outlined
above. In Connecticut and Vermont, state supreme courts
ruled that the education clause contained in the state consti-
tution creates a "fundamental right" to education. They also
ruled that disparities in per-pupil spending due to per-pupil
property-wealth disparities violate the state equal protection
clause, and that the principle of fiscal neutrality creates a less
discriminatory alternative. Each court also decided that while
exact equality in per-pupil expenditures is not required, over-
hauled finance systems could not allow district expenditures
to vary with district wealth.
In the McDuJj~ case, the Massachusetts Supreme Judi-
cial Court based its decision on the mandate contained in
the state constitution’s education clause. The court said that
the state is constitutionally required to provide an
"adequate"education for all citizens without regard to eco-
nomic status, and that spending disparities due to local prop-
erty tax funding violate this mandate. While the court did
not order the complete overhaul of school finances, it or-
dered the Commonwealth to design a system that would
provide an "adequate education" for all citizens regardless of
the fiscal capacity of the district in which they live. The court
issued a loose oudine of an adequate education for the legis-
lature to use in reforming the system. These guidelines acted
as the foundation for the subsequently enacted performance
reforms.
New Hampshire’s recently decided Claremont case dif-
fers in a significant way from every other case previously dis-
cussed. The plaintiffs, including five school districts, a student
from each district, and eight property taxpayers fi’om differ-
2The equal protection clause in the U.S. Constitution is contained in the
Fourteenth Amendment and states that "no person can be denied equal
protection under the laws7
3 The principle of fiscal neutrality states that per-pupil spending across
communities cannot be related to a statistically significant degree to
per-pupil property valuations across communities. Assuming that all
education expenditures are financed through the local property tax,
Chart 1 illustrates a system that is not fiscally neutral.
4The Rodriguez case was the first and only case to be argued in the federal
courts.ent districts, challenged the system based on unequal treat-
ment of taxpayers. They argued that charging taxpayers in
different communities different property tax rates violated
their constitutional right to equal protection. This argument
also relied on an idiosyncratic provision of the New Hamp-
shire constitution: that all taxes must be proportionate) In
its ruling, the court stated that the constitution requires the
state to provide an "adequate" education. Therefore, all rev-
enues raised for education are state taxes. Since all education
taxes are state taxes, then the proportionate taxation clause
mandates that education-specific property tax rates must be
equal for all taxpayers within the state.6 The legislature ad-
journed at the end of July without enacting a remedy.
Available Fisoal Remedies
Three basic fiscal remedies are used to address dispari-
ties in resources for financing schools: a completely state-
funded system, a foundation expenditure system, and a
guaranteed tax base system.
1.The most obvious solution to fiscal disparities is for
the state to completely fund the school system, using broad-
based taxes that can be redistributed to school districts for
operating expenditures - thereby achieving exact per-pupil
resource and expenditure equalization. However, under such
a system, states find it dit:lqcult to balance the goals of local
control and local accountabiliW. If states completely fund
education through fiscal assistance with no strings attached,
localities can use the state funds for tax relief or for programs
other than education. If the states earmark the aid for edu-
cation, the states control education finance to an unaccept-
able degree. Consequently, states prefer a system where
schools are jointly financed, and states have some say over
how their school aid is spent.
2. In the foundation expenditure system, a state-deter-
mined expenditure level provides a base (or foundation) for
a minimally adequate education. The state guarantees this
expenditure by funding (with state aid) the difference
between the foundation and what the district can raise from
its property wealth at some target tax rate. Theoretically,
districts that can achieve this expenditure with their own prop-
erty resources could be required to pay all funds raised above
5 The courts in New Hampshire have interpreted this provision to mean
that all statutory tax rates must be applied equally to all taxpayers
within an appropriately defined jurisdiction.
6 In the Claremontcase, the defendants claimed that tile appropriate
jurisdiction was the local school district. Since property tax rates were
applied equally to all taxpayers within a district, then the system was
constitutional. The court ruled that since education was a state
responsibility, the appropriate jurisdiction was the entire state. Since
property tax rates were not equally applied across districts, the equal
protection clause in the state constitution was being violated.
the foundation back to the state for redistribution to prop-
erty-poor districts. If foundation systems actually imple-
mented this redistributive payback, then exact per-pupil
expenditure equalization would be achieved. In practice, this
payback is not required. Property-rich districts are given no
state aid, or a relatively small flat grant.
Because property-rich districts are not subject to pay-
back, the degree of expenditure equalization achieved by a
foundation system depends upon the level at which the foun-
dation expenditure is set. Equalization is achieved solely
through the mechanism of raising school districts at the bot-
tom of the expenditure distribution to the foundation ex-
penditure level. If the foundation is set very low, mm~y districts
will spend above the foundation. Per-pupil expenditures will
continue to vary with per-pupil property values, so that only
a small degree of equalization is achieved. If the expenditure
is set at a high level, relatively few districts will spend in ex-
cess of the foundation, so that considerable equalization is
realized. Furthermore, if the foundation expenditure level is
not adjusted for rising costs, then the real (inflation-adjusted)
foundation expenditure will shrink over time. Conmaunities
will be forced to rely on their own resources to compensate
for cost increases, leading to greater spending disparities.
3o Under the guaranteed tax base (GTB) system, the
state determines a level of property wealth that each district
is guaranteed as a tax base. Any district with wealth below
the guarantee receives state aid that is proportional to the
increment in property wealth needed to raise district wealth
to the guaranteed base. In its purest form, any district with
wealth above the guarantee pays contributions to the state
that are proportional to the decrement in property wealth
required to lower the district’s wealth to the guaranteed base.
In practice, payback provisions are rarely implemented. The
amount of state aid (or payback) depends upon the locally
determined property tax rate. Districts with wealth below
the guaranteed tax base can increase their state aid by taxing
themselves at a higher rate.
Since this system equalizes property tax bases across dis-
tricts, the problem of raising local revenues out of property
wealth that varies across districts is eliminated. Nevertheless,
a GTB system is not completely wealth neutral. Because each
district can choose its own property tax rate, a positive rela-
tionship between property wealth and expenditures could
still exist if property-rich communities tax themselves more
heavil}: Furthermore, some districts could set a tax rate that
does not provide a minimally adequate expenditure level from
the guaranteed tax base. To avoid this problem, many ana-
lysts advocate a multi-tier system. The first tier is either afoundation system or a system of complete state funding for
the foundation expenditure to ensure that all districts achieve
some minimal level of expenditure. The second tier is a GTB
system that allows local districts to supplement the founda-
tion expenditure, subject to tax base equalization.
Legislative Remedies
in New England
To address the Horton decision, the Connecticut legisla-
ture enacted a modified GTB system that also includes ele-
ments of a foundation expenditure system. First, instead of
forcing property-rich communities to share revenues with
property-poor communities, the state set the GTB at a very
high level (the 95th percentile of property valuation), so that
most communities receive equalizing state aid. The few com-
munities that are at or above the GTB receive a minimal flat
grant. Second, the state set a maximum local property tax
rate. This tax rate ceiling caps GTB aid. Third, the state set
a minimum expenditure level, similar to a foundation ex-
penditure system. To force compliance, the state withholds
equalizing aid for any community that levies a tax rate below
this minimum.
However, during its fiscal crisis in 1991, Connecticut
changed to a foundation expenditure system. Since districts
that spend above the foundation are not subject to payback
provisions, many districts have raised non-equalized local
property tax revenues to offset the reduction in state aid.
Recent figures released by the Connecticut Teachers Associa-
tion suggest that disparities in spending have increased as a
result of the change. A group of communities led by the City
of Bridgeport filed suit in early 1998 to challenge the foun-
dation system in court. The case is pending.
The Shejfv. OWeil decision in 1996 also affected
Connecticut’s school finances. The plaintiffs claimed that the
state’s school system was highly segregated (racially, ethni-
cally, and economically). The state Supreme Court ruled in
favor of the plaintiffs, blmning segregation in the schools on
the statutorily drawn school district boundaries. The state is
preparing a plan to consolidate school districts (inter-
districting) to address the Shejfdecision (see Fiscal Facts,
Spring/Summer 1998). Because the new inter-districting plan
alters the distribution of property wealth across districts, state-
aid formulas will need to be modified.
Vermont enacted a two-tier system. The state supreme
court called for "substantial equality" in educational expen-
diture, but did not order complete equality. The legislature
enacted a statewide property tax and combined this with
additional state revenues to provide each district ~vith a flat
grant of $5,000 per pupil. For the second tier, local commu-
nities have the option of raising additional revenues to spend
in excess of the state grant. All local school taxes are designed
as a GTB system, with property-rich communities subject
to a payback provision.
Since the court did not demand a radical overhaul of
school finances in Massachusetts, the legislature modified its
pre-existing foundation aid formula. The state determines a
foundation expenditure level to meet adequate educational
standards according to the guidelines set out in the McDuffi
decision. Provisions ensure that the foundation level is rou-
tinely adjusted for changing cost conditions. The state also
sets a standard effort tax rate, which determines the property
valuation that will achieve the foundation expenditure. State
aid is provided to all districts that are below this property
valuation level, provided that they spend at least the founda-
tion amount. No foundation aid is provided to districts with
property values above this level, although they may be eli-
gible for other aid. The legislation includes a seven-year phase-
in period that extends through FY2000.
Implications and Conclusions
School finance reform is a complicated and lengthy un-
dertaking that generally takes many years to implement. Al-
though most states provide some form of equalizing aid, state
governments are generally loath to enact voluntarily addi-
tional equalizing measures because of the tradition of local
control. Reformers rely on the courts to remedy inequitable
financing systems as part of a continuing process. When this
litigation is successful, court decisions force state governments
to play an even more active role in financing the education
of their citizens.
All enacted reforms attempt a difficult balancing act, try-
ing to forge a compromise between two contradictory tradi-
tions: equal opportunity and local control. Consequently,
enacted reforms do not achieve exact fiscal equalization, but
do result in greater equality than the pre-reform system. How-
ever, became enacted reforms remain open to future court chal-
lenges, educational finance reform is likely to remain an issue
for the foreseeable future. In the next issue of Fiscal Facts, we
continue this series by evaluating the reforms enacted in New
England to see how equalizing they have proved to be. Ft~Across the Region
R evenue collections finished fiscal year 1998 with a bang. A hefty budget surplus, ranging
from 5 to 10 percent of total revenue collections, was recorded in every New England state.
The cornucopia led to supplemental spending increases enacted for FY99, but also provided the where-
withal for major tax reductions in Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island. In addition, an obscure
tax provision enacted in Maine five years ago kicked in, leading to an unexpected sales tax reduction.
Educational finance reform continues to be newsworthy across the region -- Connecticut and Mas-
sachusetts are making large investments in state aid to education, while Vermont has begun to implement
Act 60. Meanwhile, New Hampshire continues to struggle over how to comply with the Claremont
decision (see FiscalFacts, Spring/Summer 1998), with efforts to amend the state’s constitution to allow for
property tax disparities being seriously considered.




Millions of Dollars Change
Connecticut 8,621.3 8,912.7 3.4
Maine 2,055.4 2,226.1 8.3
Massachusetts 15,232.9 16,110.8 5.8
New Hampshireb 1,188.1 1,222.1 2.9
Rhode Islandc 2,568.5 2,782.4 8.3
Vermontd 1,303.5 1,329.7 2.0
a Unless otherwise noted, includes general fund and transportation fund appropriations onb/. Excludes
b expenditures of federal grants and reimbursements.
Includes budgeted income from sweepstakes earmarked for foundation aid and special education. c Includes general revenue and other unrestricted funds.
d Includes Act 60 spending for FY99 FY98 expenditures are appropriately adjusted for comparison.
Source: Official budget documents, state financial statements, and conversations with state budget officials.
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Connecticut
Connecticut collected $7.5 billion in FY98 tax revenues,
up 7.5 percent from FY97. Personal income tax collections
were up 16.0 percent, while sales tax revenues were up 6.2
percent. The state realized a revenue surplus of $794.1 mil-
lion. Given net supplemental spending of $27.6 million, the
state was left with a budget surplus of $766.5 million (8.9
percent of expenditures).
At the end of May, Governor John Rowland signed into
law an $8.9 billion own-source revenue budget for FY99 -
$291 million, or 3.4 percent, above final FY98 spending lev-
els. Two major spending initiatives and a tax cut are included
in the budget. The state plans to allocate $2 billion for local
aid, up 10.2 percent from FY98 levels. A major portion of
the local aid increase is for education, up $124 million from
FY98. The second initiative is $1.3 billion in spending for
capital projects, primarily in Hartford, Bridgeport, and New
Haven. About $140 million of the expected budget surplus
is to be devoted to tax relief, $100 million in the form of an
income tax rebate and $40 million for property tax abate-
ments. Another $80 million of the expected surplus is set
aside to fix the Y2K problem in the state’s computer software
systems. An additional $125 million will be deposited in the
state’s rainy day fund. The remaining $422 million is dedi-
cated for expenditures continued to FY99.
Maine
Total general fund revenues collected in FY98 were $2.2
billion, up 15.1 percent from FY97. Forecasters had bud-
geted for revenue growth of 3.5 percent for the year. Sales
and use tax collections grew 12 percent from one year ago,
while individual income tax collections grew 17.5 percent,
F(I 1l/I Vin let’ 1998and corporate taxes grow by 10 percent. Maine finished FY98
with a revenue surplus of $125 million (6.1 percent of ex-
penditures), of which $78 million was alldcated to two tax
relief funds and $23.5 million was deposited in the state’s
rainy day fund. As of June 30, the rainy day fund balance
was $91.5 million (4.4 percent of expenditures). The remain-
ing $23.5 million (1.1 percent of expenditures) was carried
into FY99 as undedicated balances.
Whenever total revenue growth exceeds 8 percent for any
fiscal year, a Maine statute triggers a reduction in the state sales
tax rate of 0.5 percentage points in the following year. Since
the state controller has determined that revenue growth ex-
ceeded 8 pement for FY98, this statutory tax reduction took
effect in October 1998. It is expected to cost $60 million
annually in forgone sales tax revenues.
Massaohusetts
For FY98, the Commonwealth collected $14.0 billion
in tax revenues, up 8.9 percent from FY97 levels. Both per-
sonal income tax collections and corporate tax collections
grew faster than projections -- up 11.8 percent and 10.7
percent, respectively. Sales tax collections, which exhibited
sluggish growth for most of the year, were up 3.0 percent.
Since the enacted FY98 budget projected negative revenue
growth of 0.2 percent, the state realized both a revenue sur-
plus and an operating budget surplus. The operating budget
surplus totaled $1.2 billion (7.9 percent of expenditures).
The Governor enacted into law a $16.1 billion own-
source revenue budget for FY99, 5.8 percent above final FY98
expenditures. The FY99 spending increases are dedicated to
education and human services. Total educational expendb
tures will increase by $310 million, of which $253 million
will be used to fully fund the state’s contribution required by
the 1993 Education Reform Act.
Two tax cuts were also enacted into law: an income tax
cut of $970 million and an insurance industry tax cut of
$240 million. The income tax legislation includes both a
$770 million permanent tax cut and a one-year $200 mil-
lion tax break. The permanent income tax reduction doubles
the personal exemption for all taxpayers (retroactively to Janu-
ary 1) and reduces the tax rate on unearned income from 12
percent to the earned income tax rate of 5.95 percent.
Both the one-year temporary income tax cut and the phase-
in of the insurance industry tax reduction will be funded from
this year’s $1.2 billion budget surplus. In total, over half of the
surplus ($607 million) is allocated to tax breaks. The remain-
ing surplus is allocated for $190 million in one-time capital
spending mad a $378 million deposit into die rainy day fund.
New Hampshire
General fund revenue collections totaled $968 million
for FY98, up 8.3 percent from FY97 and exceeding the 2.7
percent growth rate projected at the start of the fiscal year.
The resulting revenue surplus was $50 million. The stron-
gest revenue gains came from business taxes and meals and
rooms taxes, which were up 14.5 percent and 7.6 percent,
respectively. In addition to a tax amnesty program, state offi-
cials attribute the boost in revenues to positive economic con-
ditions. The economic climate, the mild winter, and tourism
activity all helped meals and rooms tax revenues to exceed
projections.
The state is still trying to respond to the Supreme Court’s
decision in Claremont School District v. Governor. Because
the state constitution mandates that education is a state re-
sponsibility, the court ruled that property taxes levied by local
school districts are state taxes. Therefore, the court decided
that a system in which local property tax rates vary widely
violates the state constitution’s equal protection clause (see the
article in this issue).
The ABC plan, proposed by state leaders, would have
replaced local property taxes with a statewide property tax lev-
ied at a uniform rate (see Fiscal Facts, Spring/Summer 1998).
However, for property-rich districts that can raise sufficient
revenues to fund schools at tax rates below the statewide rate,
the ABC plan would have required sending "excess" revenues
back to these districts -- in effect maintaining local tax rate
disparities. The supreme court decided that, like the status
quo, the ABC plan did not pass constitutional muster.
Rhode Island
Based upon preliminary year-end FY98 figures, Rhode
Island collected a total of $1.6 billion in taxes, up 14.6 percent
from FY97 collections. Personal income tax collections, sales
tax collections, and corporate tax collections all exhibited strong
growth, up 14.6 percent, 8.5 percent, and 5.2 percent, respec-
tivel~ These preliminary figures suggest that the state realized
a revenue surplus of $149 million. The budget office projects
additional net expenditures of $21 million, leaving an operat-
ing general fired surplus of $128 million.
In June, Rhode Island enacted a $2.8 billion own-source
revenue budget for FY99, up $214 million (8.3 percent) over
the projected FY98 figure. The budget includes one major
spending initiative, a $43 million increase in aid to local
schools. Most of this increase ($31 million) will be allocated
to six urban school districts. The remaining $12 million will
be spread among other districts across the state. The budget
also includes a shift of $33 million in capital maintenanceRevenues from the Two LargestTaxes
in Each New England State
FY98 Compared with FY97
m Sales
Business Profits
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conversations with state budget officials.
outlays from the capital budget to the operating budget. The
budget stipulates that the entire DEPCO (Depositors Insur-
ance Corporation) tax (0.6 percentage points of the sales tax
rate) is to be used to retire DEPCO debt ahead of schedule.
A tax reduction package was also enacted. This will gradu-
ally eliminate some local motor vehicle excises and business
inventory taxes. The state will increase local aid to compen-
sate communities for the resulting revenue losses. This addi-
tional state expense is expected to total $245 million per year
when fully phased in. The motor vehicle excise tax reduction
will begin next summer and will exempt the first $1,500 of
each vehicle’s value from taxation. This exemption will increase
every year until the tax is eliminated in FY05. The inventory
tax will be phased out over ten years. Once DEPCO debt is
eliminated in the year 2001, sales tax revenues dedicated to
DEPCO will be used to finance the local aid reimbursements.
Vermont
Tax revenues exhibited strong growth in FY98, ending
12.8 percent above FY97 levels as compared with projected
growth of 4.3 percent. Personal income tax collections were
up 13.1 percent, sales and use taxes grew 12.8 percent, and
corporate taxes grew 20.6 percent. However, Act 60, the edu-
cational finance reform bill, resulted in statutory changes to
both sales and corporate taxes. After adjustment for these
changes, sales and use taxes grew 8 percent, and corporate taxes
grew 1.2 percent. Vermont closed FY98 with a $61 million
revenue surplus and, given some expenditure cuts, ended the
year with a $76.8 million operating budget surplus.
Vermont enacted into law an own-source revenue budget
of $1.33 billion for FY99 - a 2.0 percent increase over FY98
levels and $4.4 million (0.3 percent) above the Governor’s
recommendations. A large portion of the budget surplus, $60
million, is earmarked for the new education fund. Another
$13 million will be used to fund some one-time capital projects,
including state buildings, school construction, sewers, and water
systems. The remaining $3.8 million will go into the budget
stabilization fund.
Act 60 includes a property tax relief provision. Taxpay-
ers whose total household income is less than $75,000 are
not required to pay more than 2 percent of their income in
property tax. If a household with a maximum of 2 acres of
land is assessed a property tax bill that exceeds 2 percent of
household income, the state must return the excess in the
form of a rebate. Since property taxes have yet to be paid this
year, the rebate will come as an advance refund (termed a
"pre-bate") from the full payment of taxes that will be re-
ceived later in the year. Pre-bate checks totaling $46.8 mil-
lion were mailed out in July. In the future, property tax rebates
will take the form of an income tax refund system. FF
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